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Chapter 5
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: COURT DELAYS
AS A BARRIER TO ACCESSION
Alan Uzelac
Faculty of Law
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
An efficient system for the protection of civil and human rights is
essential for the achievement of the ideals that are a precondition for join-
ing the European Union (EU). This paper analyses the origins of the cri-
sis of the Croatian judicial system and the factors that have brought the
length of court proceedings into the centre of professional and political
debates. Strategies for accelerating civil proceedings featured in current
attempts at reform are presented, with an emphasis on the ongoing pro-
cedural reforms in litigation, enforcement and bankruptcy proceedings.
At the end doubts are expressed about whether it is possible to make any
important advances with the operations planned. Without an efficient
judiciary, however, it is impossible to have a complete transition to the
model of the democratic liberal state, and a dysfunctional judicial system
can bring the implementation of economic reforms into question as well.
To this extent, then, a thoroughgoing reform is of first-rate importance
for the creation of the preconditions necessary for EU membership.
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INTRODUCTION 
It is universally held that the length of court proceedings is one
of the fundamental and most important symptoms of the crisis in jus-
tice in Croatia. In Croatian justice, however, there are some other if less
obvious and less quantifiable dysfunctions, from lack of experience and
knowledge in trials that result in poor-quality results to difficulties with
the possibility of providing unbiased and just adjudication for some cat-
egories of parties and types of cases. Nevertheless, the problem of pro-
viding for fair trials in reasonable time has, at the beginning of the third
millennium, come to the surface as the most concrete and most striking
problem on the way to creating a state of law and order, and the rule of
law.
The EU enlargement process assumes the inclusion of new
states that have to the greatest extent overcome the difficulties of the
transition, among which is the creation of an effective system for the
protection of rights granted to citizens. A functioning judiciary is a pre-
condition for the accomplishment of the political and legal ideals on
which the EU is based – the ideals of the rule of law. As community of
not only economic but also political and cultural values, the EU
assumes that its member states have the ability to implement pro-
claimed political views, and that the rights granted by the law of the
Community can, if necessary, be effectively protected in the courts of
the member states. Since the harmonisation of EU law is based on the
principle that the legal instruments of the Community are by and large
being implemented by the national courts, the functioning of these
courts is a sine qua non for the functioning of the legal system of the
Community in the territories of the new members.
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL JUDICATURES
Although the EU is increasingly taking on characteristics that, if
it were not for certain resistances and historical sensitivities, could well
publicly be labelled as “federalism”, its legal order is to a great extent
put into life through the national institutions, primarily the national
courts. Accordingly, in the EU, national judicatures are losing their
national or local character and becoming a part of the wider European
system of justice, the national courts becoming European courts.i
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Integration processes in the EU so far have not negated specific
features of organisation and procedure of national justice systems. In
principle, national procedural autonomy has been acknowledged for
each state – that is, the right to organise its own judicial system in the
manner it considers most appropriate. No matter how a particular jus-
tice system is organised, the protection of rights granted to individuals
and legal persons (and rights recognised by EU law) has to be effective.
This idea was, in various forms and manners (though with some incon-
sistencies), expressed also by the European Court in Luxembourg.ii
The emphasis of Luxembourg decisions that have commented
on and directed the activities of the national courts in the EU in the con-
text of the application of European law has most often been on the
achievement of substantial harmonisation in the application of the law
of the Community, and particularly on suppressing discriminatory
effects through procedural mechanisms likely to vitiate the basic prem-
ises of the EU, such as free movement of people, services and good.
The importance of harmonisation at the level of the results of proce-
dures, irrespective of the organisational and procedural differences of
the national systems, is heightened by the fact that all the countries of
the Union participate in a universal system of reciprocal recognition of
judgements and other final decisions made in other member states, so
that a judgment made in Lisbon can without any double-check be sim-
ply acknowledged in Berlin as a judgement of value equal to those of
the German courts and vice versa. In addition, every EU citizen has to
be provided with a roughly equal level of protection of his rights wher-
ever he or she might happen to be in the EU, irrespective of which court
it is that is determining his or her rights. For this reason, one of the pos-
tulates of European integration is that in all the countries of the EU an
equal or maximally equivalent degree of protection of subjective rights
should gradually be attained. 
As for countries with aspirations to be EU members, the ques-
tion of the capacity and effectiveness of the judiciary appears addition-
ally at a much more elementary level – at the level of meeting the basic
political criteria that demand future members to be stable democracies
with institutions capable of guaranteeing fundamental human rights and
putting into effect the principle of the rule of law. Thus in the process of
the accession of those countries that will join the EU in the first wave,
an important role was assigned to the reform of their judiciaries, and at
the local and the international level their progress in the creation of a
competent and independent judiciary was monitored most attentively.iii
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One of the indicators of the degree of the readiness of national
judicial institutions for full membership is contained in the practice of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg with
respect to the candidate countries. As a kind of political entrance lobby
to further integration, the Council of Europe (CoE) has so far covered
practically all the potential candidates for membership in the future,
and the jurisdiction of the ECHR for individual applications with
respect to CoE members has enabled a comparison, among other things,
of the level of protection of human rights that is attained by the nation-
al judiciaries. A particular place in this context is taken by the practice
of the ECHR with regard to the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms), both in the sense of the right of access to jus-
tice as well as the right to equality of arms and, particularly, the right
to a trial within reasonable time. To the political importance of the prac-
tice of the ECHR in the future another, strictly legal element may be
added, for the EU is seriously considering the possibility of acceding to
the European Convention as a separate entity. At the same time, the
rights that are protected by the Convention are already included in the
drafts for a future European Constitution. The level of protection of
fundamental rights under the Constitution would in no case be below
that of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.iv
In any event, the integration process even within the current
membership of the EU is increasing the importance of having a highly
competent and effective judicial system.  With the Amsterdam Treaty
of 1999, home and justice affairs were shifted from the third to the first
pillar of the Union, that is, into an area that is of immediate concern to
the Union. Implementing this shift, the Tampere Summit of 1999 pro-
vided for concrete measures by which the EU should be made “an area
of liberty, security and justice” by May 2004. Cooperation in the area
of home and justice affairs is thus made a matter of common European
concern, and the political priorities have set the deadlines for harmoni-
sation that will run out in the not very far future.
THE LENGTH OF COURT PROCEEDINGS
IN CROATIA
As candidate country for EU membership, Croatia too will have
to attend very carefully to the challenges of harmonisation in the judi-
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cial area. It is beyond any doubt that the administration of justice in
Croatia is currently burdened with a series of grave problems. In this
paper we shall deal in particular with the problem of the length of judi-
cial proceedings that, in spite of all the other problems, has assumed a
highly prominent position.
The reasons for taking up the topic of the length of judicial pro-
ceedings in public discourse were completely independent of the
process of joining the EU, motivated in the first place by a number of
inherent reasons and incentives, the most obvious of which we shall
give in succinct form.
Several sets of judicial statistics published in the nineties indi-
cated that the number of unsettled cases, alongside a constant influx,
had more than doubled.v In addition, some highly exacerbated cases in
which the procedure in court had lasted several decades came into
media focus.vi After Croatia became a member of the CoE in 1997, the
first cases put before the ECHR in which violations of human rights
were found, related precisely to the infringement of the right to a trial
within a reasonable time.vii In addition, it would seem that there are
other tactical reasons for the focus on the question of length of proce-
dure. Apparently, it is a value free, non-political question, which can
draw the attention of the general and professional public away from
other, more sensitive matters, such as the questions of lustration, cor-
ruption, incompetence, bias and (social and political) responsibility for
the quality of justice (Uzelac, 2001:23-66). Putting the duration of pro-
cedures at the centre of interest not only may easily create an appear-
ance of serious reform, but can also serve as argument for redistribution
of the social product to the benefit of some classes (by claiming larger
investments in the judiciary, particularly in the wages of judges and the
quantitative enlargement of judiciary personnel).viii
This brief catalogue of arguments shows that the current public
interest in the problems of length of court proceedings is in essence
somewhat superficial. This will also be shown by the analysis in this
paper, by pointing out that the reforms that are undertaken are only par-
tial, and the will to put them into effect is questionable at the very least,
even among those who consider themselves inveterate reformists. The
fundamental problems of the lack of efficiency in the justice system – set-
ting up a political system in which the citizens will have confidence in the
judiciary as warrant for their personal, political and economic rightsix -
are mainly absent from discussions about accelerating judicial proceed-
ings. But irrespective of this, the length of proceedings is a serious prob-
lem, which we shall deal with in this paper, while other judicial problems
in the creation of the rule of law will be touched on only incidentally.
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COMPARISON OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
It is no easy matter to compare judiciaries in terms of their level
of efficiency and quality. Because of the already mentioned national
procedural autonomy both within and without the EU, organisation,
competence and procedural rules of courts show such a degree of diver-
sity that it is almost impossible to subject them to a simple methodolo-
gy of comparison. Judicial statistics are adjusted to national specifici-
ties, and it is therefore very difficult to compare them even if they relate
to countries of the same legal and cultural sphere. No uniform criteria
for comparison have been worked out. The elaboration of such criteria
is now only just getting into the agendas of international institutions
interested in judicial reform, such as the World Bank and the newly
founded European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ)
of the CoE.x
As a result, only an indirect assessment of the current situation
is possible, from some indirect indicators and isolated examples. For
this reason, such an assessment is necessarily subjective, and may
become the subject of political appraisal and political negotiations.
At a professional level, it is broadly accepted that, at the begin-
ning of the third millennium, the degree of harmonisation of the pro-
cedural rules and the organisation of the judiciary even with respect to
the current members of the EU is at a fairly low level. The harmonisa-
tion of procedures – for the moment only at the level of rapprochement
– is achieved only indirectly and in marginal areas. Admittedly, the
Amsterdam Treaty has transferred cooperation in the area of justice
and home affairs from the third to the first pillar of the Community,
stressing the need for uniformity in the EU as area of “liberty, securi-
ty and justice”. However, the aspiration towards uniform standards has
so far been limited to the area of the mutual recognition and execution
of judicial decisions, i.e., to facilitating the access to the court for those
EU citizens that are in the territory of other members, with the ultimate
intention that every EU citizen can have equal access to bodies of state
power everywhere in Europe, as if it were to do with his or her own
national bodies. For this purpose, the directives of the Brussels I and
II conventions on the execution of judicial judgements have been
passed; directive 1348/2000 about service of process in judicial and
extrajudicial matters, and directive 743/2002 about general rules for
encouraging cooperation in the area of home and justice affairs. Also
in preparation are uniform forms – the so-called European
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Enforcement Title – for facilitating the filing of enforcement pursuant
to judicial decisions made in uncontested matters in the territory of
another member country. In order to stimulate cooperation and facili-
tate the access of citizens to courts, the launching of a European Day
of Civil Justice is scheduled for 2003, as an event that would be organ-
ised in the member countries (and candidate countries) at the end of
each October.
With all these activities, judicial practice, procedural style and
in particular the degree of efficiency of the machinery of justice are all
still very different in the countries of the EU. If we stick only to a gen-
eral evaluation of the speed and user-friendliness of procedures,
extremes can be found in the EU as well, from the rapid and simple pro-
cedure in e.g. Germany to the complex and lengthy procedures of Italy.
In particular with regard to Italy, the problem of length of court pro-
ceedings is still far from being settled, and the number of cases in which
Italy has been found liable for infringements of the right to a trial with-
in a reasonable time at the ECHR is alarming.
As far as the state of justice systems of the candidate countries
is concerned, here the assessments are also divergent, but on the whole
not very good. A study of judicial capacity in the first ten candidate
countries resulted in the collective evaluation that “in any country judi-
cial reform is bound to be fraught with obstacles, difficulties and delays
– and more so in Central and Eastern European countries, after half a
century of communist rule during which courts and the law itself were
debased and used as mere instruments of power” (Monitoring EU
Accession: Judicial Capacity (2002:7). As for the assessment of
reforms, it is pointed out that evaluations from national reports reveal
“...a vivid illustration of a number of paradoxes: profound structural
reforms are needed in all these countries in order to provide the judicial
system with the capacity to fulfil its constitutional mission according to
the requirements of a democratic society. Such reforms require a strong
and lasting political will from Governments and Parliaments – but one
may ask if such a will really exists, or even how consistent the EU itself
has been in calling for such commitment”.xi
The fact that Croatian problems with the judiciary are not unique
is not in itself consolatory. Even when it is compared with countries in
which judicial problems rank high, the Croatian judiciary is bringing up
the rear, vividly shown by the results of public opinion research that
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have shown that only in Croatia do the courts occupy the last place
regarding public trust in social institutions.xii This is also shown by
recent surveys carried out at the request of Transparency International,
in which to the question “from which institutions would you first of all
eradicate corruption” respondents placed health care first, and the
courts immediately afterwards. Seventy percent of citizens involved in
the survey had the impression that corruption is to be found in the judi-
ciary. Recently it became public that the national budget has already
paid out over a million kuna in damages to parties for violations of the
human right to a fair trial within reasonable time (of this about 110,000
euros because of decisions of the ECHR and about 200,000 kuna as a
result of decisions of the Constitutional Court of the RC). According to
all these indicators, even with tolerant behaviour of the competent fac-
tors, it is to be expected that essential progress in the reform of the judi-
ciary will be among the main conditions that need to be met before join-
ing. The more so because after May 2004 – the deadline proclaimed at
the Tampere Summit in 1999 for Europe as an area of freedom, securi-
ty and justice – the threshold for new members will certainly be higher
than it is today.
PROJECTS FOR ACCELERATING COURT
PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL MATTERS 
Acceleration of court proceedings is as a rule just as complex as
every other far-reaching reform in the judicial system. Simple and uni-
lateral interventions are not adequate where long-lasting and funda-
mental problems are concerned. In Croatia too changes directly or indi-
rectly related to acceleration are being planned (and to a smaller extent
carried out) in a number of areas, not only with respect to reforms of
procedural legislation (which, although overburdened with some inad-
equate provisions, is not the main cause for the lack of court efficien-
cy), but also in respect to organisation and human resources, and to
projects directed at the users of judicial services.
We would hence attempt to group the heterogeneous accelera-
tion projects into six strategies, which would, in our opinion, be identi-
fiable in current initiatives. These are:
• procedural reforms (modification of court procedures and dispute res-
olution routines for the sake of their streamlining and simplification);
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• transfer of assignments currently carried out by the courts to other
state and social services and private professions (particularly to the
notaries), and transfer of assignments which are not at the centre of
the judicial function to other persons inside or outside the court;
• encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by arbitration or by set-
tlement  reached either through direct negotiations or with the help of
mediators;
• changes in the organisational structure of the justice system at the
national level (the system of jurisdiction) and at the level of individ-
ual courts (reorganisation of the court administration);
• technical and logistic improvements (introducing new technologies,
particularly IT; reorganisation of the delivery and register depart-
ments); 
• programmes for improving the quality of judicial personnel (tighten-
ing up the quality criteria during recruitment, a system of on-going
education and professional further training).
This fairly extensive list in essence more or less covers all the
possible ways in which a given country might oppose the problems of
inefficiency in its justice system. In the following paragraphs, we shall
devote particular attention to strategies that relate to attempts to speed
up the civil proceedings in the narrow sense (current and heralded
reforms of procedural codes applicable to litigation, execution and
bankruptcy laws). A presentation and assessment of changes in relation
to other types of procedure (criminal, administrative and so on) are not
the subject of this paper, while the organisational, personnel and other
aspects have also been partially dealt with in other works (Uzelac,
2002a, 2002b), and partially contained in an expanded version of this
paper (Uzelac, 2003).
A REFORM WITHOUT A REFORM:
CURRENT DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE
IN PROCEDURAL LEGISLATION
Changes aimed at accelerating court procedures in Croatia are
concerned most of all with three large procedural codes: the Code of
Civil Procedure (CCP), the Law on Enforcement, and the Bankruptcy
Law. As stated earlier, the process of amending these laws was not
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completely logical and expected. The most important and fundamental
law, the CCP, has not been essentially changed until 2003. In force was
the slightly modified former Yugoslav Code of Civil Procedure of 1976
– although the draft of a comprehensive reform was prepared already
back in the mid-nineties. Only in autumn 2002 was this draft sent to
parliamentary procedure, and finally adopted in July 2003 (NN
117/03). 
On the other hand, the two other laws had a very different fate.
Nor were they modified much earlier than the CCP, but completely new
legislation was passed – as early as 1996 the Law on Enforcement (NN
57/96, 29/99, 42/00) replaced the Execution Procedure Law, and the
Bankruptcy Law (44/96, 161/98, 29/99, 129/00) the Act on Forced
Settlement, Liquidation and Bankruptcy. Both new laws were again
essentially amended only two or three years after their enactment, and
another round of amendments – which partially consist of the abandon-
ment of some features introduced by preceding amendments – are part
of a new package of laws that were passed by the Parliament in 2003 in
the last months before the elections.
All in all, it would seem that the changes in procedural legisla-
tion in the last ten years are affected by a hopeless chaos. There is a
wide awareness that court procedures fail to satisfy the needs of the cit-
izens for efficient and timely protection of their rights. But in spite of
many announcements of reforms, in spite of the flood of new legisla-
tive drafts and new legal provisions, or even the whole new laws, the
basic routines and basic structures have hardly been changed. To back
up this claim, we shall attempt to pick out some of the basic tendencies
of past and future reforms. The purpose of this survey is limited to the
most important elements of the numerous normative changes, because
irrelevant details may stand in the way of an integral picture of the
essential. And this essential might be summed up as follows: numerous
legislative changes, tentatively called a “reform”, have not yet led to a
real and fundamental reform capable of bringing about a system of jus-
tice appropriate to the needs of modern liberal democracies in the fore-
seeable future.
Litigation procedure
The underlying intention of the reform of civil proceedings was
to achieve acceleration of the litigation procedure by tightening up
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measures to enhance procedural discipline, i.e., to put an end to strate-
gies of procedural abuses. Although both concepts – of abuse of the
procedural rights and procedural discipline – are controversial,xiii it
would seem that a good part of the changes rests on the administrative
and apparently paternalistic logic, according to which the problem of
court delays can be mostly blamed on the behaviour of the parties, and
hence the solution should be in increasing the amount of the penalties
that the court can hand down during the process if it considers that some
action of the participants is aimed at delaying or blocking the procedure.
The most far-reaching structural change in the context of speed-
ing up proceedings is somewhat ambivalent, and partly contrary to
other changes that give the court more authorities in the procedure. For
the sake of accelerating the proceedings and reinforcing the liability of
the parties (and their counsel), the judges are generally deprived of the
authority to order evidence ex officio.xiv This abandons the previous
inquisitorial principle in evidence taking, and limits the process of fact-
finding to the evidence submitted (or requested) by the parties. It is
somewhat paradoxical that the reform attempts to achieve acceleration
by means opposite to those that are commonly used in similar reforms
for this purpose – most trends in other countries endeavour to speed up
procedures by strengthening and not by limiting judicial activism.
Many other changes from the voluminous draft of the new CCP
are mainly of a partial nature. The concentration of the hearing at the
trial stage will not easily be put into effect if it is left to the optional
financial sanctions and possibility of reimbursement of costs caused by
postponing hearings. The power to pronounce a default judgment is
strengthened only in cases when the defendant failed to submit within
the time limit a written statement in reply, when a new default judge-
ment (presuda zbog ogluhe) may be made. Later failing of parties to
appear at the hearings will continue, it would seem, to be unsanctioned.
Since the judges of the superior courts particularly took part in
the shaping of the final draft, it is not unusual that the smallest changes
were made precisely with respect to the appellate procedure. For the
sake of procedural discipline, the possibility of invoking new facts and
evidence on appeal will be limited. But apart from that, there is hardly
any change: decisions on appeals will still be made in camera, without
the regular presence of the parties and their counsel. The legal possibil-
ity, so far unused in practice, of carrying out a second instance public
hearing, instead of being reaffirmed, has been deleted from the text of
the law. The possibility of the multiple striking of judgements in the
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same case and sending them back for retrial – without any final solu-
tion by the second instance – will not be changed.
Overall, it would seem that the so-called reform of litigation
procedure will just be a step in the continuity, and not a discontinuity
with the generally dissatisfactory practice. Some dozen years earlier
perhaps it would have been enough as a first step. Today, one can
express the fear that disturbance and destabilisation of the system that
three hundred articles of amendments may bring will outweigh the ben-
efits. One of the likely scenarios – that we nevertheless hope will not
happen – is that after a certain period of time in which the degree of
legal certainty and efficiency in the justice system will be even lower
than hitherto, the courts will find a manner to go back to their present
routines, including their earlier perception about the appropriate length
of proceedings.
Enforcement procedure
Current plans for reforms of the enforcement procedurexv show
an acute absence of any clear vision, even one regarding the diagnosis
of the origins of the problems. Instead of deformalising complex proce-
dures and reinforcing some of the most important enforcement methods
– above all, the enforcement on movable property, traditionally and sta-
tistically most important – current plans look to a completely different
scenario. The current plan of reform provides for a kind of “outsourc-
ing” of the enforcement from courts to other services. Although the
idea of taking the caseload of the courts and shifting some of their tasks
in execution of their judgments to other actors and private services is a
step in the right direction, almost everything else in the intended reform
is bewildering. The main pillar of the reform consists in transferring
jurisdiction for issuing writs of enforcement to public notaries. One
might observe that this would lead to the transfer of perhaps the only
activity that should have remained in courts (and that in practice led to
the fewest difficulties). On the other hand, the area in which the ineffi-
ciency of enforcement was the greatest remains untouched. The sym-
bolically and practically most important type of enforcement is seizure
and sale of movable property (which can almost be taken as a metaphor
for any enforcement of court decisions). This method of enforcement is
still in the courts - where it has least place. This is the logical result of
the first and fundamentally mistaken law policy assessment: that
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enforcement can in its entirety or at least to a great part be successful-
ly transferred to the notaries. It would seem that the drafters of the
reform, blinded by the relative success that the notaries have had in
their work to date, have overlooked that the logic of the functioning
of the notaries is completely opposite to the logic that a successful
bailiff needs to follow. Public notaries provide legal certainty, while
bailiffs (enforcement agents) should provide efficiency; notaries
operate by following abstract formal rules, while bailiffs have to be
guided by the logic of economic rationality; public notaries carry out
a sedentary office-bound job, while bailiffs have to be mobile and
operational. 
All in all, if these plans of reform are put into effect (which have
been hurriedly and without any real discussion made law because of
electoral promises to do something in this area, but with a delay that can
call them at least partially into questionxvi), only negative results can be
predicted. The execution process might become even slower and more
formalised than it has been so far, even more so because of the com-
pletely unnecessary shuffling of files from courts to notaries and back
again. If this scenario comes into being, the most likely outcome will
be that the new amendments will follow the fate of some previous
reforms that have been undertaken only to be repealed after a few
months or years as unsuccessful.
Bankruptcy proceeding
Reform of the bankruptcy procedure shares the fate of reform of
enforcement procedure. Bankruptcy proceedings in Croatia are also
inefficient: their duration is excessive and it is difficult to achieve bank-
ruptcy’s basic functions – the liquidation of the insolvent debtor and the
just satisfaction of his creditors. In Croatia, bankruptcy law was for the
first time radically reformed the same year as enforcement law, when a
new law on bankruptcy was enacted.xvii After the old socialist legisla-
tion, the new law to a great extent mirrored the new German bankrupt-
cy law. This, however, did not help to establish effective and just bank-
ruptcy law. In the first five years of the application of the law, bank-
ruptcies were seldom carried out, and if they were, it was with great dif-
ficulties. Two sets of major amendments aimed at “contributing to the
general functioning of the procedure” and the suppression of “unde-
sirable tendencies in practice” did not help much either (Dika, 2001:4).
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The political environment played a great although not the only
role in the inefficiency of the bankruptcy procedure. Right up to 2000,
bankruptcies were politically rather unpopular, and were therefore dis-
couraged. The general policy of the government at that time even
encouraged an overt disregard of the law in order to avoid filing for
bankruptcy and keep jobs at any cost. The government elected in 2000
attempted to change its view, but the wave of bankruptcies that fol-
lowed had political consequences that once again had a negative effect.
Thus, a consistent application of the law and the strict policy of bank-
ruptcies everywhere the conditions for them were ripe was not
achieved.
The incapacity to put the law into effect in the area of bankrupt-
cy led to attempts to solve the problem with further changes in the
law.xviii The justification for the newest set of amendments, among other
things, is based on the assessment that the procedures in bankruptcy
were too complex because of the great number of bankruptcy bodies;
that not even the given explicit duties that the law enjoined were actu-
ally respected; that the bankruptcy procedures were unnecessarily
lengthy, that they were dragged out, that they became an end in them-
selves and that the bankrupt estate was often mainly spent on the costs
of the procedure; that the secured creditors, particularly the banks, were
often not interested in a rapid conduct of the bankruptcy proceeding,
since very high interest continued to accrue to their secured claims; that
some legal grounds for the refutation of the illicit transactions of the
bankrupt debtor were too stringent and that it was difficult to prove
them; that the position of the privileged creditors in the bankruptcy
process was not defined clearly enough, particularly the relation
between the enforcement proceedings filed to collect the secured claims
and the bankruptcy proceedings; and so on.xix
Planned changes, however, in this round will not be of a far-
reaching character. An attempt will be made at accelerating the pro-
ceedings by abandoning the institution of the bankruptcy panel of
judges and confiding its entire jurisdiction to a single judge. In addition,
the draft also foresees the setting of deadlines for making certain key
decisions in the procedure and their implementationxx and makes minor
adjustments, especially between the bankruptcy and the enforcement
proceedings carried out to collect the secured debt.xxi For this reason,
here too it is hard to expect that the state of inefficiency and/or self-suf-
ficiency of bankruptcy proceedings from the assessment of the drafters
of recent amendments will be changed in the near future. 
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RECONCILING TO INEFFICIENCY?  NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR
AVOIDING APPLICATIONS TO THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The inefficiency of trials in Croatia had an epilogue in proce-
dures before the ECHR in Strasbourg. From November 5, 1997, when
Croatia became a member of the CoE and thus recognised the jurisdic-
tion of this court, the greatest number of applications pertaining to
Croatia filed in Strasbourg relate precisely to infringements of the right
to a fair trial in a reasonable time, as defined in Article 6 of the
Convention. The case of Rajak v. Croatia was filed with respect to a
suit that was started in 1975 and was after 25 years practically at the
place where it started. However, the greatest number of cases filed on
this basis related to cases started before the beginning of the 1990s,
which related to individual new areas that the courts were only painful-
ly getting acquainted with, for example, “financial engineering” (i.e.
financial fraud), damages directly or indirectly related to military oper-
ations or terrorist actions, the transformation of social into private prop-
erty (with the ancillary questions of denationalisation and the fate of
tenants’ rights), rights of political succession and so on. In most of such
cases, the procedure at the time the case was referred to the ECHR was
not started in the real sense of the word.  Some other cases in which
there was a violation of the right to a trial within reasonable time were
not so long lasting but related to the sensitive area of family relations,
and showed the inability of the courts to provide timely trials in cases
that were legally proclaimed urgent and in which the legally protected
interests required particular expeditiousness.xxii
When it was seen that the length of court proceedings could
bring down an avalanche of procedures against Croatia, comparable
with the number of cases on the same basis against Italy, the state start-
ed to work on the problem with legal interventions. Since the attempts
to speed up procedure described above had to show effects only in long
term, or did not show the expected success over the short term, an
attempt was made to dampen the negative political consequences of the
Strasbourg judgments. Thus in 1999 a new Constitutional Law con-
cerning the Constitutional Court (NN 99/99) was passed. In this the
provisions concerning a constitutional complaint because of violations
of human rights were amended with a provision according to which
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“The Constitutional Court may, exceptionally, examine a constitution-
al complaint prior to exhaustion of other available remedies, if it is sat-
isfied that a contested act, or failure to act within a reasonable time,
grossly violates a party’s constitutional rights and freedoms and that, if
it does not act, a party will risk serious and irreparable consequences.”
After this, one of the defences that the state would adduce in a
procedure before the Strasbourg court always related to the question of
the exhaustion of legal remedies as defined by Article 35, Paragraph 1
of the Convention. The Government claimed that because of the failure
to exhaust domestic legal remedies all cases should be declared inad-
missible in which there had previously been no constitutional com-
plaint filed because of the length of the procedure.
This defence, however, did not at the beginning bear the desired
result. The ECHR in the case of Horvatxxiii versus Croatia ruled that a
constitutional complaint defined in this way was not an effective legal
remedy for the protection of the right of the person making the applica-
tion. It was found that the admissibility of this kind of complaints
depended on the discretionary assessment of the Constitutional Court,
which would allow the suit only “exceptionally”, applying its own
understanding of the inadequately precisely determined legal standards
such as “gross violation”, and “serious and irreparable consequences”.
The Constitutional Court also had no other sanctions available to it than
a mere determination of a violation. For this reason, in this and in other
similar cases applications regarding the violation of the right to a trial
in a reasonable time would still be considered admissible, even without
a procedure being concluded before the Constitutional Court.
Another set of amendments came not quite three years after the
passing of this Constitutional Court Law.xxiv These once again revised
the provisions about the filing of a constitutional suit because of viola-
tion of the right to trial in a fair time. The new provision of Article 59a
that became, in the revised text, Article 63 of the Constitutional Law,
did away with the exceptional nature of the complaint, so that it became
possible to submit it always when the party appealed to violation of the
right to trial in a reasonable time. The discretionary elements in the
decision-making were removed, and thus the possibility of assessing
whether violations and consequences were “grave” or “irreparable”. It
was also provided that, if a constitutional complaint was accepted, the
Constitutional Court “shall determine a time-limit within which a com-
petent court shall decide the case on the merits” and in addition “shall
fix appropriate compensation for the applicant in respect of the viola-
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tion found concerning his constitutional rights”.xxv Such compensation,
according to the law, would have to be paid out of the national Budget
within three months of the application of the party for payment.
New provisions on constitutional complaints soon led to
changes in the attitude and practice of the European Court. From the
decision in the case of Slavièekxxvi the Court adopted the understanding
that the constitutional suit of Article 63 of the Constitutional Court Law
was an effective legal remedy and that for this reason the person who
submitted an application to the court because of violation of the right to
trial in a reasonable time has to exhaust this remedy, too. Even more,
from the case of Nogolica on,xxvii the court has considered that this le-
gal remedy has to be exhausted even in those cases that were filed in
Strasbourg before the most recent amendments to the Constitutional
Law. In these decisions, which are in line with the efforts of the court
in Strasbourg to limit the inflow of cases, there was a reference to the
introduction of similar legal remedies in other countries, e.g. in Italy
and Poland.xxviii
Over the short term, the new practice of the ECHR will certain-
ly lead to a fall in the number of Croatian cases submitted to the court
in Strasbourg, which started to rise vigorously in 2002.  Namely, from
the time of the entry into force of the Convention in Croatia until today,
i.e. in the 1998-2001 period, 307 suits were filed against Croatia.
Suddenly, in the first ten months of 2002, there were 560 new applica-
tions. The cases were mainly filed because of violation of the right to a
trial within a reasonable time. The press began to talk of a stampede of
Croats on Strasbourg.xxix It is dubious, however, whether over the long
run the obligation to file a constitutional complaint under Article 36
will prove to be an effective legal remedy, or whether – as the former
chairman of the Constitutional Court Jadranko Crniæ stated – the new
practice will turn out to be a “requiem for the Constitutional Court”
(Crniæ, 2002:258-288). In fact, the Constitutional Court, even before
the amendments to the Constitutional Law, had experienced a consid-
erable increase in the number of its cases.xxx If the annual number of
over 2,000 constitutional complaints – a number that, according to
statements from the Court, stretch its work to the limits of its capacity
– will be increased by at least some percents of the several tens of thou-
sands of cases in which an application for the acceleration of the proce-
dure and a demand for a just compensation might be made,xxxi it could
easily happen that the actual Constitutional Court itself would be just
one more link in the chain of violations of the human right to a trial
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within a reasonable time. The more so that its endeavours to maintain a
restrictive attitude to constitutional complaints even after the new
amendments have already suffered a debacle.xxxii
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
At the moment, the attempts to accelerate court proceedings in
Croatia are going in many different directions, both at the organisation-
al and at the procedural level. Optimistic announcements from the
Ministry of Justice argued that the new measures would eradicate
delays and backlogs in Croatian justice system by December 31, 2007,
“if not earlier”.xxxiii Yet it seems that the structural difficulties with
which the Croatian judicial system is faced are much more serious. The
current plans for reforms, though they have the support in principle of
both the government and international institutions, and are not wanting
in resources, have little chance of real success, primarily because of the
shortage of a clear vision and conception of the changes. In part, this
shortcoming is not so illogical – the absence of vision is partially just a
symptom of the lack of any serious and sincere wish for fundamental
reforms. The legal establishment and the ruling elites in good part are
not ready at base for the shock that an efficient and well-functioning
legal system might lead to, although all the power structures nominally
swear by it. Problems of adjustment of the legal system to the social
structure that is based on the political principles of liberal democracy
and market economy escape the sphere of the normative – they are of
an institutional nature, starting off from the human resources and the
social structure (as well as the structure of awareness) of all those who
should see to it that the law is implemented. These are primarily the
legal professionals – the judges, attorneys, notaries and others who take
part in the functioning of the judicial system. Their structure and psy-
chology change slowly, and structural and institutional advances since
the period of socialism are almost insignificant. 
For the sake of achieving a level of efficiency in the legal sys-
tem that would bring Croatia closer to European integrations, inciden-
tal legislative changes are not sufficient. Instead of that, it is necessary
to elaborate a broader plan that would aim at three linked strategic
objectives. These are:
• A stable legislation of high quality. Laws and other general legal
instruments should be the outcome of a rational process. Legal provi-
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sions should be appropriate, consistent and easily applicable, and
equally intelligible to those whose behaviour they are to regulate and
to the courts and other bodies that have to apply them. To the extent
that this is possible, the normative environment should be stable – fre-
quent changes that introduce legal uncertainty and additionally con-
tribute to lack of efficiency are to be avoided.
• A competent and efficient judiciary. Judicial institutions, in the first
place the courts, should be to a high degree qualified to carry out the
tasks assigned to them. Judicial officials and employees should have
adequate education, capabilities and training, and the division of juris-
diction; the organisation of work in the judicial institutions and the
logistics should be appropriate. Good and efficient work should also
raise the degree of public trust in justice and the legal institutions in
general.
• Respect for the results of legal proceedings and efficient implementa-
tion of court and other decisions grounded in the law. Efficiency of
the legal system is illusory if the decisions made in the procedure pre-
scribed by law are not effectively implemented. Irrespective of any
possible political or social dissatisfaction with the consequences of
the decisions made, which is inevitable in some cases (bankruptcies,
for example), decisions founded on law have to be carried out effec-
tively, because otherwise a dangerous legal inequality is created and
the elementary principle of the government of the rule of law is called
into question.
In the list of recommendations below measures are proposed
that should be undertaken for the achievement of these strategic objec-
tives. Most of the measures proposed are linked with strategic objective
number two, which is the centre of future endeavours, and is linked by
synergy with the first and third: a well-functioning judiciary will more
easily overcome the drawbacks and failings of the legislative process,
and, with its integrity and the public trust in it, will contribute to the
results of procedures being respected.
• Enabling strategic planning and action regarding the efficiency of the
legal system. A primary objective should be to establish reliable
empirical methods of monitoring the problems in the judiciary. For
this reason the government and the non-governmental sector should
support research into the problems of the functioning of the judiciary
on a scientific and professional basis. The monitoring of the work of
the judicial system at qualitative and quantitative levels should be
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reformed, considering that today’s statistics are not well adjusted to
modern demands. Pursuant to a new methodology, it is necessary to
define criteria for the efficient work and the evaluation of judicial
services. Finally, the legislative process should be linked with the
requirements of future implementation, setting up the missing link
between ideas and their feasibility (which sometimes includes proper
informing of the bodies that apply the law about the desired aims and
results that some new legal instruments wish to achieve).
• Reorganisation and restructuring of the judicial bodies and services
according to rational criteria. The current irrational organisation and
structure of the judicial bodies and services should, pursuant to new
empirical methodology, be adjusted to the demands for efficiency and
quality of work. Recommendations in this area would relate to, for
example, the adjustment of the number of judicial bodies, their area
and subject matter jurisdiction to the needs of the efficient operation
of the system as a whole. There should be a clear delimitation of the
fields of the work of courts and judges as against other services and
professions. The framework criteria for legal services should be
adjusted to European criteria and national requirements. Current roles
and functions of certain judicial services and professionals (judges,
court advisers, attorneys, notaries and so on) should be subject to a re-
examination. As part of such a re-examination, a kind of outsourcing
of some tasks currently undertaken by courts should be put into prac-
tice, following the practice of other transition countries: some of the
assignments that the judicial bodies carry out now may be shifted to
the jurisdiction of appropriately qualified and supervised private pro-
fessions. 
• Systematic monitoring of the course of proceedings, suppression of
delaying tactics, repetitions and periods of inactivity, and general
increase of the speed and efficiency of legal procedures. Efficiency is
inconceivable without appropriate case management. Much of the
backlog can be ascribed to obsolescent methods of court administra-
tion, which should be comprehensively reformed. For this purpose,
the potentials of information technology should in particular be used,
for they would make possible a centralised monitoring of legal pro-
ceedings and management of court cases. Such a system, which would
require a competent body at a national level, would enable a rapid and
appropriate reaction to emergencies (for example, the sudden increase
of the inflow of particular cases brought about by a change in legisla-
tion or by other reasons). In addition, it would enable further concen-
tration and acceleration of legal proceedings in routine and formulary
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matters (which would be more or less automated, with a minimum
input of work by senior judicial officials, particularly judges). This
work should cover not only first instance proceedings, but also hear-
ings at appeals and superior levels – which is actually the part in
which the current reform of litigation proceedings has done and
achieved less.
• Increasing the motivation and responsibility for efficient work of all
participants in the proceedings. The manner of recruitment, promo-
tion and motivation of judges and other judicial employees followed
to date has not led to striving at excellence and efficient work.
Systematic motivation for efficiency should be created, which would
range from strengthening responsibility for inefficient work of poor
quality, to rewards (higher chances for promotion and similar incen-
tives) for exceptional achievements. In addition, measures should be
undertaken to reduce the contributions of other participants in the
process – particularly of attorneys and forensic experts – to the delays
in legal proceedings. These measures would include the restructuring
of the manner of awarding lawyers’ fees to the winning party (to dis-
courage dragging out cases over a number of hearings), and special
sanctions for expert witnesses that do not submit their findings and
opinions in an orderly way and in time.
• Ensuring a high level of competence of all persons who carry out judi-
cial functions. Citizens can have confidence in the judiciary only if it
is clear that the individuals of the highest quality perform the highest
functions in it. Without high quality judiciary personnel it is hardly
possible to have efficient decision-making. In order to turn current
trends around, it is necessary to bring a completely new system of
selection and promotion of judges and other employees in the judici-
ary. The basic feature should be a high level of objectivity in recruit-
ment and the obviation of all discretionary decisions that, because of
the long tradition of nepotism and political influence, have marked
practice to date. In this context, it is particularly necessary to carry out
thoroughgoing reform of the current bar exam, introducing strictly
anonymous testing to result in the precise ranking of candidates, the
success of whom should be monitored via a Gauss curve. These con-
ditions would also include an obligatory training programme for fur-
ther professional education and the training of judiciary employees.
Finally, through all these essential structural changes one should
shape the contours of a new Croatian judiciary, which requires new
people, prepared for a changed function and the imperative of effi-
cient work. For the successful performance of duties on the bench it
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is necessary to have an adequate combination of experience and
enthusiasm. For this reason mobility in the legal profession needs
stimulating. Those who lack readiness to work in an environment that
requires efficiency should be stimulated to retire or change jobs, while
their places would have to be filled by qualified new personnel.
Today, the recommended measures may sound somewhat utopi-
an. However, the great project of harmonising national standards with
the highest standards of the Old Continent is somewhat utopian – it
requires a great deal of changes, including those that can for some peo-
ple have the significance of tectonic changes. The process that this
paper has attempted to anticipate will be neither rapid nor easy, but
without its successful conclusion, it will be impossible for Croatia to
join the European community successfully. It will equally be impossi-
ble to realise Croatia’s own ambitions to establish a state that would
observe civilised standards in the area of the rule of law. 
i See the indicative title of one dissertation: Æapeta (2002).
ii Doctrine calls this thought and its variations in different ways (the principle of
effective judicial protection, the principle of minimal effectiveness). Cf. ibid, pp.
104-165. 
iii See e.g. the reports dedicated to the judiciaries of the countries of the first round
of candidates deriving from the programme of monitoring the accession pro-
gramme by the OSI – Judicial Capacity (2002) and Judicial Independence (2002).
iv See Smerdel (2000). Actually, the future EU Human Rights Charter will become,
according to the current proposal, a component part of the Constitution of the EU,
and it does contain the guarantee of a fair trial in a reasonable time drafted in line
with the current wording of Article 6 of the European Convention.
v According to the Justice Ministry's Statistical Review of 2001, in 1989 there were
1,240,000 new cases before the Croatian courts; about 485,000 cases were con-
sidered to be the backlog. Five years later, in 1994, there were only 1,086,000 new
cases, but the backlogs had risen to 640,000. In 1998, the influx of cases was
1,086,000, but there were 895,000 cases in arrears. In 2001, there were 1,200,000
new cases, but the number of backlogged cases had exceeded a million –
1,020,413.  In 2003 backlog is estimated to about 1,200,000.These data do not
include misdemeanour courts. Statistical Review, Justice Ministry, 2001, March
2001.
vi For example, the Rajak case, which after 25 years of litigation came to the ECHR
– see the next note.
vii The following cases: Rajak (49706/99), Mikuliæ (53176/99), Fütterer (52634/99),
Kutiæ (48778/99), Cerin (54727/00) and so on (see http://hudoc.echr.coe.int). 
viii In 1999 the wages of judges were significantly improved, assuming that this would
essentially contribute to the speed and quality of justice. In 2003 the same justifi-
cation is used to support plans to increase the budgets for court buildings and
equipment, and employ new judges. This was preceded by a campaign of the pres-
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ident of the Supreme Court Ivica Crniæ, who several times stated that “precisely
through the provision or non-provision of the conditions for the work of the courts
can we see exactly how much the Croatian government cares about achieving the
rule of law”, at the same time expressing the view that in the Croatian judiciary
no radical changes were necessary. See Ponoš, 2002.
ix According to the results of a research into the political agendas of twelve coun-
tries of South-East Europe carried out by the Stockholm International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, in Croatia of all the social institutions, the
citizens have the least trust in the judiciary - only 17% (poll carried out in
February 2002).  A more detailed analysis according to category of respondent
shows that those who are crucial for modern liberal democracy (who have the
most experience with the judiciary), the educated middle class between 30 and 60,
is lowest. See http://www.idea.int/balkans/survey.cfm.
x See http://www.coe.int/cepej.
xi Ibid.
xii See note 10 above.
xiii See the assessments of one of the rare public presentation of the drafts of the new
CCP held at the Law Faculty in Zagreb under the title “Abuses in civil proce-
dure”, Bulletin of the meeting, http://www.pravo.hr (May 2003).
xiv The previous first and second paras were deleted from Article 7 of the CCP. Under
these paragraphs the court was supposed “to determine completely and truthfully
the disputed facts on which the claimant’s claim is granted”. For this purpose the
court was authorised, though not obliged, to order taking of evidence ex officio if
it considered that this evidence was important. Instead of this, the court now has
the same position in relation to both facts and evidence: producing of evidence
(and finding facts) may be ordered ex officio only if it there are doubts regarding
the legal permissibility of parties’ actions, i.e., if the court considers that the par-
ties in a suit (which, as a rule, relates only to private interests of the parties)
attempt to evade the mandatory regulations and achieve effects that violate the
rights of third parties and of public morality. In other words, the court can no
longer determine the production of evidence if it is necessary solely for the deter-
mination of facts on which the claims that only affect rights and obligations of pri-
vate parties in litigation – and this concerns the majority of civil litigation.
xv Amendments to the Law on Enforcement were adopted in the Parliament on
October 15, 2003, but were still not published officially at the time of the last revi-
sion of this text. See the final text of the draft at http://www.sabor.hr (agenda of
the 37th Session, p. 31).
xvi Transfer of some of the activities in enforcement to the jurisdiction of the notaries
is put off for a period of one year after the law comes into force. This will perhaps
open the opportunity to reconsider this plan, and abandon it.
xvii Bankruptcy Law (Steèajni zakon), NN 44/96, 161/98, 29/99 and 129/00.
xviii Amendments to the Bankruptcy Law were accepted in July 2003. See NN 23/2003.
xix See the explanatory notes in the draft of the Amendments to the Bankruptcy Law
from April 2003 (http://www.vlada.hr, 39th session; www.sabor.hr, 32nd session)
p. 2.
xx This is a strategy that was shown in some earlier laws to be unsuccessful. E.g. the
Family Law, Art. 269/2 provides for the holding of the first hearing in marital and
family matters in a period of fifteen days from the day the suit is received in the
court. Article 270 orders the making of the second instance decision in a period of
thirty days from the day of launching the appeal. Both provisions in practice pro-
voked more laughter than practical results, because they were infeasible and
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hence the practice ignored them entirely. On the whole, most such deadlines, that
the legislators put in with great optimism, have been interpreted as a so called
“instructive deadline”, i.e., as an orientation target, that may be exceeded without
affecting the validity of the actions taken. Disciplinary procedures because of
exceeding of such “targets,” although theoretically possible, have never been
taken. In fact, as almost none of the judges stuck to such deadlines, the responsi-
bility for the breach of the law was attributed to the legislator, who has enacted a
law that is not capable of being implemented.
xxi These adjustments derive, it would seem, more from the incapacity of the practice
to come to logical results by interpretation, than from real deficiencies in the pre-
vious wording. 
xxii For example, the determination of paternity in the case of Mikulics
(http://hudoc.echr.coe.int).
xxiii Horvat v. Croatia, 51585/99, judgement of July 26, 2001 (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int).
xxiv Amendments to the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court, NN 29/02,
revised  text in NN 49/02. 
xxv Art. 63/1 and 2 of the Constitutional Law. In the provision that relates to the just
compensation, the law went even beyond the Convention, because it assumes that
compensation has to be paid in every case in which a violation of the right to a
trial in a reasonable time was found.
xxvi Slavièek v. Croatia, 2086/02, admissibility decision, July 4, 2002.
xxvii Nogolica v. Croaita, 77784/01, admissibility decision, September 5, 2002.
xxviii See the view of the ECHR in the case Brusco v. Italy, 69789/01. The court also
referred to changes in Polish law after the case of Kudla v. Poland, 30210/96.
xxix See the Panorama supplement, Vjesnik, October 19, 2002, p. 14.
xxx Statistics show a significant rise in the number of constitutional complaints: 25
filed in 1993; 642 in 1995; 925 in 1999; 1910 in 2001 and about 2500 in 2002.
Ibid., p. 272.
xxxi It is often quoted that in only one court alone - the Zagreb Municipal Court - there
were at one time (in 1998) 10,463 pending cases older than 10 years.
xxxii In the case of Šoæ v. Croatia (47863/99) the ECHR in a judgement of May 9, 2003
has already determined that CC’s rejection of a constitutional complaint to a vio-
lation of reasonable time, with the justification that the procedures alleged to have
lasted unreasonably long have in the meantime been completed, itself violates the
right to an effective legal remedy from Article 13 of the European Convention. 
xxxiii From the document Judicial Reform, http://www.vlada.hr/Download/2002-
/12/07/016-01.doc p. 21.
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